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Abstract
We study the eects of credit shocks in a model with heterogeneous entrepreneurs,
nancing constraints, and a realistic rm size distribution. As entrepreneurial rms can
grow only slowly and rely heavily on retained earnings to expand the size of their business
in this set-up, we show that, by reducing entrepreneurial rm size and earnings, negative
shocks have a very persistent eect on real activity. In determining the speed of recovery
from an adverse economic shock, the most important factor is the extent to which the shock
erodes entrepreneurial wealth.
1 Introduction
The recent turmoil in nancial markets has had deep consequences for the allocation of credit
within the economy. Access to credit is particularly important for nascent and growing rms,
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1for which it is much more dicult to only rely on retained earnings as a source of nancing.
In this paper, we study the eect of various types of nancial shocks in a model with two non-
nancial sectors: a corporate sector, primarily composed of mature rms, and an entrepreneurial
sector, whose leverage is limited by their inability to fully commit to repay their debts. The
constraints generate a large, and realistic, dispersion in rm size, and limit the rate at which
entrepreneurial rms can grow. We build on the entrepreneurship model of Quadrini [43] and
Cagetti and De Nardi [13, 14], and introduce a nancial intermediation sector that channels
resources from savers to users of capital. Both entrepreneurs and corporate rms require access
to intermediated funds. The reliance of entrepreneurs on intermediaries is one of the param-
eters used in our calibration, and is most associated with matching the ratio of the wealth of
entrepreneurs to that of workers. We calibrate directly the reliance of corporate rms on outside
funding to match data from the ow of funds.
Our main experiment considers the eects of an increase in the cost of channelling funds
through intermediaries, which increases the cost of borrowing and, in general equilibrium, also
depresses the rate of return earned by savers. This shock can be the result of either a negative
productivity shock in the nancial intermediation sector, or the destruction of capital specic to
this sector (e.g., the loss in value of mortgage-backed securities). For the parameters that best
match our target moments, we nd that entrepreneurial rms are aected to a deeper extent
than corporate rms. To the extent that entrepreneurial rms tend to be smaller, this is in line
with the empirical ndings of Gertler and Gilchrist [21]. When intermediation costs return to
their steady-state levels, both entrepreneurs and corporate rms stage an initial rebound, but
the path to a full recovery is then slow. The wealth accumulation of the entrepreneurs is aected
in a very persistent way. Negative credit shocks reduce rm size, and, because entrepreneurial
rms can grow only slowly, limit the speed at which rms return to their previous scale when the
shocks subside. This slow transition is characterized by more capital misallocation and hence
lower output than in steady state.
An increase in intermediation costs also generates an endogenous tightening of borrowing con-
straints, as entrepreneurial activity becomes less protable and the outside option of absconding
2part of the capital becomes comparatively more attractive; this channel accounts for about 50%
of the drop in entrepreneurial rm size.
Government policy interacts with the nancial disruption. We study two aspects of this inter-
action. First, the recession initiated by the nancial shock creates a shortfall in the government
budget. If income taxes are raised to nance this shortfall, they constitute a new, independent
drain on entrepreneurial prots, which can be even bigger than the nancial shock itself, and
leads to an even longer recovery. Second, we analyze the eects of government targeted interven-
tion in the nancial markets, that drives a wedge in the cost of funds across dierent classes of
borrowers. Our experiment is closest in spirit to the U.S. Treasury's guarantee of money market
mutual funds (and implicitly of the underlying commercial paper): we consider a case in which
the government is able to completely and costlessly insulate the corporate sector from the shock.1
This guarantee is helpful in reducing the depth of the recession, but it does nothing to improve
the recovery, as it concentrates the shock onto the sector that is most vulnerable in the long run.
We contrast the eects of our baseline shock with alternative scenarios, such as a collateral
shock, that makes it harder for entrepreneurs to pledge future repayment of debt, similar to
Jermann and Quadrini [30], or a traditional TFP shock. We nd that the response to these
shocks may be quite similar, to the extent that the balance sheet of entrepreneurs is hit in a
similar way; the evolution of this balance sheet is the key element that aects the speed of the
recovery. In our set-up all these shocks have a very persistent eect on real activity.
2 Related Works
Many works incorporate credit-market frictions in macroeconomic models but, rather than study-
ing the direct eect of shocks to these frictions, they focus on how these frictions aect aggregate
investment and help generate and amplify business uctuations. Among the earlier and most
inuential contributions, Bernanke and Gertler [8] introduce agency problems such as costly
1The government guarantee of money-market mutual funds was indeed costless ex-post for the United States
in the recent crisis; we choose a costless specication not because we believe that it was costless ex-ante, but to
show that this guarantee is not a panacea even in the best-case scenario.
3state verication in a dynamic general equilibrium set-up, and Kiyotaki and Moore [34] further
illustrate the impact of collateral constraints and their interaction with asset prices and rms net
worth. In both papers, credit imperfections link investment decisions to the rms' balance sheets
and generate a \nancial accelerator" that amplies and propagates shocks to the macroecon-
omy. The recent nancial crisis has given further impetus to this literature, highlighting both
the many channels through which credit market imperfections can aect real activity, and the
possible eects of government interventions to improve the functioning of credit markets and
the ow of funds between borrowers and lenders. For a review of this literature, see Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist [9] for earlier contributions and Gertler and Kiyotaki [22], Brunnermeier
and Sannikov [10] and Krishnamurthy [36] for more recent ones. Here, we only mention a few of
the papers most related to our work.
We model several types of nancial frictions. Financial intermediation (and more in general
frictions in credit markets) introduce a wedge between the returns to lender and the cost of
capital to borrowers, a wedge related to the spread between liquid and easily intermediated
securities such as Treasuries and corporate bonds. These credit spreads vary over time and
their level and variation have been shown to be empirically correlated to and potentially key
to understand output uctuations (for instance, Gilchrist, Sim and Zakrajsek [23], Christiano,
Motto and Rostagno [16], and Adrian and Shin [1]). Their role has been highlighted, among
others, by Hall [26], who show that in a simple representative-agent economy credit spreads
(including those for households) are powerful determinants of economic activity and can generate
uctuations of the magnitude of those seen in the recent crisis, and by Curdia and Woodford [19],
who study how monetary policy rules should respond to shocks to credit spreads. We also nd
that spreads have a signicant impact on aggregate output during a credit crisis; by themselves,
spreads have a fairly short-lived eect in our model economy. It is a dierent source of frictions
that propagates the eect of spreads and generates a very persistent drop in output.
Among borrowers, we explicitly distinguish corporate and entrepreneurial rms; the lat-
ter potentially face dierent constraints and have reduced access to nancial markets (see e.g.
Quadrini [42]). We model credit frictions to entrepreneurs as endogenous borrowing constraints
4arising from imperfect enforceability of debt contracts (as in Kehoe and Levine [31] and Alvarez
and Jermann [5]). In this set-up, credit availability to entrepreneurs depends on their balance
sheet and their available collateral. This class of models has been shown useful to explain, for
instance, rm-size distribution (Akyol and Athreya [6], Monge [41]), rm dynamics (Albuquerque
and Hopenhayn [2]), macroeconomic uctuations (Cooley, Marimon, and Quadrini [17], Jermann
and Quadrini [29]), and growth (Buera and Shin [12]). The presence of limited commitment slows
the growth of nascent rms and links it to the entrepreneurs' cash ow. It is this channel that
propagates the initial nancial shock in our model and is responsible for our main results. Our
paper is thus also closely related to Khan and Thomas [32], who examine the eect of capital
misallocation that result from a collateral requirement shock in a real business cycle model with
heterogeneous rms and capital rigidities.
The tightness of the borrowing constraints depends crucially on characteristics of the borrower
such as rm size, balance sheet, and personal wealth (Buera [11])). For this reason, we build a
model that quantitatively reproduces the high level of dispersion in these variables observed in
the data. Our work is thus related to the literature on wealth inequality and its determinants
(such as Quadrini and R os-Rull [44] and Castaneda, Diaz-Gimenez and Rios-Rull [15]), and es-
pecially to the literature that identies entrepreneurial wealth as a key force generating inequality
(Quadrini [42], Cagetti and De Nardi [13]). The interaction between frictions, entrepreneurship,
and inequality is crucial to understand the response to macroeconomic shocks (Jermann and
Quadrini [30]), the eect of certain government policies (Cagetti and De Nardi [14], Meh [40],
Kitao [33]), and asset pricing (Heaton and Lucas [27], Roussanov [45], Covas and Fujita [18]).
3 The Model
3.1 Demographics
A young person faces a constant probability of aging during each period (1   y), and an old
person faces a constant probability of dying during each period (1   o). When an old person
dies, his ospring enters the model, carrying the assets bequeathed to him by the parent.
53.2 Preferences
The household's ow of utility from consumption is given by
c1 
t
1  . The households discount the
future at rate  and are perfectly altruistic toward their descendants.
3.3 Technology
Each person possesses two types of ability, which we take to be exogenous, stochastic, positively
autocorrelated, and stochastically independent of each other. Entrepreneurial ability (t) is
the capacity to invest capital and labor more or less productively using one's own production
function. Working ability (yt) is the capacity to produce income out of labor by working for
others.
The entrepreneurs can borrow, invest capital, hire labor, and run a technology whose return
depends on their own entrepreneurial ability: those with higher ability levels have higher average
and marginal returns from capital and labor. When the entrepreneur invests kt production is
given by
f(kt;nt) = t(k

t (1 + nt)
(1 ))

where ;  2 [0;1]; and n is hired labor (n  0). We normalize the labor of the entrepreneur to
1. Entrepreneurs thus face decreasing returns from investment, as their managerial skills become
gradually stretched over larger and larger projects (as in Lucas [39]). While entrepreneurial abil-
ity is exogenously given, the entrepreneurial rate of return from investing in capital is endogenous
and is a function of the size of the project that the entrepreneur implements.
There is no within-period uncertainty regarding the returns of the entrepreneurial project.
The ability t is observable and known by all at the beginning of the period. We therefore abstract
from problems arising from partial observability, costly state verication, and from diversication
of entrepreneurial risk.
In addition to entrepreneurs, there is also a non-entrepreneurial sector, represented by a
standard Cobb-Douglas production function:
F(K
c
t;L
c
t) = A(K
c
t)
(L
c
t)
1  (1)
6where Kc
t and Lc
t are the total capital and labor inputs in the non-entrepreneurial sector and A
is a constant. In both sectors, capital depreciates at a rate .
3.4 Credit
External nancing to both entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurial rms is provided by com-
petitive nancial intermediaries. The intermediaries borrow funds from workers (and possibly
entrepreneurs, though in equilibrium almost all entrepreneurs will be credit constrained and will
invest all their wealth in their own rm).
Intermediation is costly. For each unit of capital, it requires t units of the consumption good
as an intermediate input.
Financial intermediaries operate competitively. At any time t, they take as given the interest
rate required by savers (it) and the interest rate paid by borrowers (rt). Given the technology,
an equilibrium with a positive and nite supply of intermediation requires
rt = it + t: (2)
For the non-entrepreneurial sector, we assume that it must nance a given fraction t of
its capital through external borrowing. This constraint can be justied by an agency problem
between shareholders and managers.
The entrepreneurial demand for borrowed funds arises endogenously in the model. As in
Kehoe and Levine [31], entrepreneurs are subject to borrowing constraints that are endoge-
nously determined in equilibrium and stem from the assumptions that contracts are imperfectly
enforceable.
In particular, as in Cagetti and De Nardi [13], we assume that the entrepreneurs who borrow
either can invest the money and repay their debt at the end of the period or can run away without
investing it and be workers for one period. In the latter case, they retain a fraction f of their
working capital kt (which includes own assets and borrowed money) and their creditors seize the
rest. We assume that labor services are paid at the end of the period, hence entrepreneurs are
not constrained in the amount of labor that they hire.
73.5 Government and taxation
The government is innitely lived. It levies taxes, pays a pension pt to each retiree, provides
a certain level gt of public purchases (which do not enter the households' utility function),
repays existing debt with interest, and issues new debt. In steady state, tax revenues from
income, consumption, and estate taxes are equal to government purchases, pension payments,
and interest payments on the debt.
We model progressive taxation of total income as in Cagetti and De Nardi [14], and use their
parameter estimates.
Total income taxes paid by each household are given by
T
i
t(Yt) = 
i(Yt)Yt + 
s
t Yt;
where i indicates occupational choice (e or w). s
t represents an additional at rate that is allowed
to adjust to meet the government budget constraint. The government also levies a sales tax on
consumption, at rate c. Estates larger than a given value e are taxed at rate b on the amount
in excess of e.
As a rst pass, we abstract from the tax implications of corporate nance decisions by as-
suming that corporate income taxes are zero and that capital gains are taxed as regular income.2
3.6 The corporate rms' problem
In each period t, a corporate rm starts with resources AC
t , which include undepreciated capital
from last period, retained earnings, and last period's equity issuance. The rm uses AC
t and new
debt (external) nancing Bt to purchase capital for operation in period t (KC
t ), subject to the
minimum external nance constraint
Bt  K
C
t : (3)
Residual internal funds can be invested with nancial intermediaries at the rate it.
Since corporate rms will always be owned by savers (workers), their objective function is to
maximize the discounted sum of prots, using the interest rate it as a discount factor.
2These two assumptions tend to oset each other.
8Formally, the problem a rm faces as of period t is described recursively as follows:
Jt(A
C
t ) = max
KC
t ;LC
t ;Bt;AC
t+1
F(K
C
t ;L
C
t ) + (A
C
t + Bt   K
C
t )(1 + it)   wtL
C
t   (1 + rt)Bt   K
C
t  
A
C
t+1 +
1
1 + it+1
Jt+1(A
C
t+1);
(4)
subject to
K
C
t  A
C
t + Bt (5)
and (3). In equation (4), Jt represents the cum-dividend value of the rm's equity in terms of
period-t goods. In period t, the rm's prots are given by F(KC
t ;LC
t ) + (AC
t + Bt   KC
t )(1 +
it)   wtLC
t   (1 + rt)Bt   AC
t+1   KC
t . Of these prots, the rm retains AC
t+1 to nance future
operations, and it pays out the rest as dividends (with negative dividends corresponding to new
equity issuance).
It is straightforward to verify that the rms' problem is homogeneous of degree 1 in AC
t .
This implies that the size distribution of corporate rms is irrelevant, and we can work with
one representative (competitive) rm. It also implies that the rm's value is proportional to
its initial internal funds: Jt(AC
t )  ^ JtAC
t . Using^to denote the optimal choice rescaled by AC
t
and denoting by !1t and !2t the Lagrange multipliers on (5) and (3) respectively, the rst-order
conditions that will hold if the corporate sector is active yield:
FK( ^ K
C
t ; ^ L
C
t )    = 1 + it + !1t + !2t;
FL( ^ K
C
t ; ^ L
C
t ) = wt; (6)
rt   it = !1t + !2t;
and
1 =
^ Jt+1
1 + it+1
: (7)
For t > 0, the envelope condition yields
^ Jt = 1 + it + !1t
From these equations, for period t > 1 we obtain
FK( ^ K
C
t ; ^ L
C
t ) =  + (1   )it + rt: (8)
9In the initial period, the internal funds of the corporate sector (AC
1 ) are exogenously given.
Depending on its value and factor prices, the corporate rms' optimization problem yields
FK( ^ K
C
1 ; ^ L
C
1 )   
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
= r1 if ^ K1 > 1
1 
2 [(1   )i1 + r1;r1] if ^ K1 = 1
1 
= (1   )i1 + r1 if ^ K1 < 1
1 :
(9)
Given our assumptions, the timing of dividend payments does not matter. Whether dividends
are kept by the rm as retained earnings, or distributed and invested by rm owners, they yield
the same rate of return it. For this reason, we assume that the corporate sector has enough
retained earnings so that ^ K1 < 1=(1 ) even when faced with the unexpected shocks described
below.3 In this case, equation (9) coincides with equation (8), and we obtain ^ J1 = 1 + i1. A
corollary of this result is that rm owners will not have unexpected capital gains (or losses)
when the shock occurs. This allows us to only keep track of their total assets invested with
third parties, without distinguishing between rm stock, funds invested with intermediaries, and
government debt.
3.7 Households
Each young individual starts the period with assets at, entrepreneurial ability t, and worker
ability yt, and chooses whether to be an entrepreneur or a worker during the current period.
An old entrepreneur that is still able to run a business can decide to keep the activity going
or retire, while a retiree cannot start a new entrepreneurial activity.
The young's problem
The value function of a young person is
Vt(at;yt;t) = maxfV
e
t (at;yt;t);V
w
t (at;yt;t)g; (10)
3In a stochastic model, corporate rms would nd it optimal to accumulate nancial asset and to ensure that
the condition above is satised, since a shortfall in resources would require costly debt nancing.
10where V e
t (at;yt;t) is the value function of a young individual who manages an entrepreneurial
activity during the current period. The term V w
t (at;yt;t) is the value function if he chooses to
be a worker during the current period.
The young entrepreneur's problem can be written as
V
e
t (at;yt;t) = max
ct;kt;nt;at+1
fu(ct)+yEtVt+1(at+1;yt+1;t+1)+(1 y)EtWt+1(at+1;t+1)g (11)
subject to
Y
e
t = (k

t (1 + nt)
(1 ))
   kt   (kt   at)(rtIkt>at + itIkt<at)   wtnt (12)
at+1 = Y
e
t   T
e
t (Y
e
t ) + at   (1 + 
c
t )ct (13)
u(ct) + yEtVt+1(at+1;yt+1;t+1) + (1   y)EtWt+1(at+1;t+1)  V
w
t (f  kt;yt;t) (14)
at  0 (15)
nt  0 (16)
kt  0: (17)
The term Y e
t represents the entrepreneur's total prots. The expected value of the value func-
tion is taken with respect to (yt+1;t+1), conditional on (yt;t). Eq. (14) determines the maximum
amount that an entrepreneur with given state variables can borrow. The term Wt(at+1;t+1) is
the value function of the old entrepreneur at the beginning of the period, before deciding whether
to stay in business or retire. We have
V
w
t (at;yt;t) = max
ct;at+1
fu(ct) + yEtVt+1(at+1;yt+1;t+1) + (1   y)W
r
t+1(at+1)g (18)
subject to eq. (15) and
Y
w
t = wt yt + it at (19)
at+1 = (1 + it)at   T
w
t (Y
w
t )   (1 + 
c
t )ct; (20)
where wt is the equilibrium wage rate.
11The old's problem
Since the old entrepreneur can choose to continue the entrepreneurial activity or retire, his state
variables are his current assets at and his entrepreneurial ability level t.4 His value function is
given by
Wt(at;t) = maxfW
e
t (at;t);W
r
t (at)g; (21)
where W e
t (at;t) is the value function for the old entrepreneur who stays in business, and W r
t (at)
is the value function of the old retired person. Dene the inherited assets, net of estate taxes, as
an
t+1 = at+1   b
t+1  max(0;at+1   et+1). We have
W
e
t (at;t) = max
ct;kt;nt;at+1
fu(ct) + oEtWt+1(at+1;t+1) + (1   o)EtVt+1(a
n
t+1;yt+1;t+1)g (22)
subject to eq. (12), eq. (13), eq. (15), eq. (16), eq. (17) and
u(ct) + oEtWt+1(at+1;t+1) + (1   o)EtVt+1(a
n
t+1;yt+1;t+1)  W
r
t (f  kt): (23)
The child of an entrepreneur is born with ability level (t+1;yt+1). The expected value of the
child's value function with respect to yt+1 is computed using the invariant distribution of yt,
while the one with respect to t+1 is conditional on the parent's t and evolves according to the
same Markov process that each person faces for t while alive. This is justied by the assumption
that the child of an entrepreneur inherits the parent's rm.
A retired person (who is not an entrepreneur) receives pensions and social security payments
(pt) and consumes his assets. His value function is
W
r
t (at) = max
ct;at+1
fu(ct) + oW
r
t+1(at+1) + (1   o)EtVt+1(a
n
t+1;yt+1;t+1)g (24)
subject to eq. (15) and
at+1 = (1 + it)at + pt   T
w
t (pt + itat)   (1 + 
c
t )ct: (25)
The expected value of the child's value function is taken with respect to the invariant distribution
of yt and t.
4We assume that the option of continuing is only open to entrepreneurs that have not lost their entrepreneurial
skill. We rule out the possibility that an old person with t = 0 chooses not to retire to preserve the future option
of starting a new business should t revert to the higher level.
123.8 Equilibrium denition
Let xt = (at;yt;t;zt) be the state vector, where z distinguishes young workers, young en-
trepreneurs, old entrepreneurs, and old retired. From the decision rules that solve the maximiza-
tion problem and the exogenous Markov process for income and entrepreneurial ability, we can
derive a transition function Mt(xt;), which provides the probability distribution of xt+1 (the
state next period) conditional on the current state xt.
An equilibrium is given by the following elements at any time t:
8
> > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > :
interest rates rt;it, a wage rate wt;
taxes (T w(:), T e(:),c, s
t , b), a bequest exemption level e, and social security payments pt;
allocations ct(x), and at(x), occupational choices,
entrepreneurial labor hiring nt(x), and investments kt(x);
and a distribution of people over the state variables xt: mt(x);
such that, given it, rt, wt, and government taxes and transfer schedules:
 The functions ct, at, nt and kt solve the maximization problems described above.
 The amounts of labor and capital employed by the corporate sector satisfy (6) and (8).
 Financial intermediaries break even, that is, equation (2) holds.
 The value of corporate rms is given by (7).
 The labor market clears, that is, the total labor supplied by the workers equals the total
labor employed in the non-entrepreneurial sector and total labor hired by the entrepreneurs.
 The capital markets clear. Total household savings (inclusive of capital owned indirectly
through the stock of corporate rms) are equal to the capital employed for production by
the corporate sector and by the entrepreneurs, government debt, and the capital used by
nancial intermediaries as an intermediate input.
 The government budget constraint balances in present value: total taxes collected plus
new debt issues equal government purchases, transfers, and repayment of previously issued
13government debt (with interest):
Z
(T
x(Yx)+
cc(x)+Io(x)
b(1 o)max(0;at+1(xt) et))dmt(x) = ptr+gt+(1+it)Dt Dt+1:
The integral is over all of the population, Io is an indicator function that is equal to one
if the person is old and zero otherwise, and r is the fraction of retired people in the
population. In steady state Dt =  D.
 The government present-value budget constraint holds, i.e.,
lim
t!1Dt
t 1 Y
s=2
1
1 + is
= 0:
 The distribution of people mt is induced by the transition matrix of the system as follows
m
0
t+1 = Mt(xt;)
0m(t)
0:
In steady state mt = m is the invariant distribution for the economy and debt, prices, and
government policies are constant and the individual's decision rules are time-independent.
4 Calibration
In this section, we describe the parameters taken from the literature or estimated outside of the
model (table 1), and the moments we use to calibrate the remaining parameters (tables 2 and
3).
4.1 Non-calibrated parameters
The coecient of relative risk aversion , the capital share in the non-entrepreneurial Cobb-
Douglas production function , and the depreciation rate  are set to values commonly used
in the literature (for instance, respectively, Attanasio et al. [7], Stokey and Rebelo [46], and
Gollin [24]).
The probabilities of aging and of dying are such that the average length of working life is 45
years and that of retirement is 11 years.
14Parameter Value Source(s)
Preferences, technology, and demographics
 1.5 Attanasio et al. [7]
 .06 Stokey and Rebelo [46]
 .33 Gollin [24]
A 1 normalization
 .015 Baa-Treasury spread
 .33 Flow of funds
y .98 average working life: 45 years
o .91 average retirement life: 11 years
Labor income process and social security payments
y;Py see appendix in Cagetti and De Nardi [14] Huggett [28], Lillard et al. [38]
p 40% average yearly income Kotliko et al. [35]
Public expenditure, government debt, and taxes
g 18.7% GDP NIPA
D see text Altig et al. [3]
c 11% Altig et al. [3]
bw .32 Cagetti and De Nardi [14]
be .26 Cagetti and De Nardi [14]
sw .22 Cagetti and De Nardi [14]
pw .76 Cagetti and De Nardi [14]
pe 1.4 Cagetti and De Nardi [14]
se .42 Cagetti and De Nardi [14]
Table 1: Fixed parameters and their sources.
15We assume that the logarithm of the workers' income is an AR(1) process and approximate
it as a 5 point Markov chain using Tauchen and Hussey's [47] method. The autocorrelation
coecient and the variance of the error term for the AR(1) process are chosen to obtain a
correlation coecient of .95 (among others, Lillard et al. [38]) and a Gini coecient for earnings
of .38 (Huggett [28] and De Nardi [20]).
The social security replacement rate is 40% of average gross income (see Kotliko, Smetters
and Walliser [35]). The steady-state ratio of government spending to GDP is set to 18.7%, and
the tax rate on consumption is 11%. All of these parameter choices are discussed in Cagetti and
De Nardi [14].
We set the steady-state nancial intermediation cost to obtain a 1.5% spread between the
interest rate paid by borrowers and that received by lenders. This is calibrated to the historical
average of the spread between Baa-rated companies and Treasuries. In our model, both public
and private debt is risk free, and the spread is entirely due to the special liquidity role of
Treasuries, that are assumed not to require any intermediation. For this reason, we choose to
match our private borrowing rate to an empirical counterpart that features low default risk but
is also unlikely to carry any liquidity premium (see Krishnamurthy-Vissing Jorgensen [37] for
more discussion). As a comparison with other securities, the average spread between AAA-
rated corporate bonds and Treasuries is about 1.25% and that between BBB-rated bonds and
Treasuries is about 2.2%.
The parameter , the constraint on debt nancing, is the average ratio of total corporate
debt to the value of corporate tangible assets, a ratio equal to about .34 in the Flow of Funds
Accounts. Corporate debt includes commercial paper, corporate bonds, mortgages, and other
loans; tangible assets include equipment and software (at replacement cost), structures (at market
value), and inventories. The ratio has generally been increasing since the beginning of the data
in 1950, from below .25 during the 1950's to values near or above .5 in recent years. This ratio
jumped to .58 immediately after the nancial crisis, as the crash in commercial real estate prices
sharply reduced the value of tangible assets, but since 2009 the ratio has been trending down
towards pre-recession norms.
16We use Gouveia and Strauss's [25] parametrization of the average tax rate:

i(Yt) = b
i   b
i(s
iY
pi
t + 1)
  1
pi; (26)
We estimate the relation separately for entrepreneurs and workers, using nonlinear least on
1989 PSID data. Our measure of total monetary income includes all forms of labor income,
capital income, transfers, and income from entrepreneurial activities. Total federal taxes paid
is the variable computed in the PSID (in our case, V18862 in the 1990 le). The dependent
variable in the regression, average tax rate, is the ratio of (PSID-estimated) federal taxes paid to
total monetary income. To obtain a representative sample, we exclude the poverty and Latino
samples. To obtain the appropriate tax rate for our model (in which the lowest income level is
positive), we also drop all observations with income smaller than $1,000 or negative taxes paid.
We dene as entrepreneurs those who declare themselves to be self-employed and own or have a
nancial interest in a business activity. The resulting sample of entrepreneurs has very similar
characteristics to those from the SCF. Our estimates would be very similar if we were to assume
a somewhat smaller or larger cuto for the amount of business income received during the period.
For the other parameters, we take a ratio of government expenditures to GDP of 18.7% (NIPA
data), a consumption tax of about 11% (Altig et al. [4]), and a level of government debt that,
given the equilibrium interest rate, yields an average ratio of total interest payments to GDP of
3% (Altig et al. [3]).
4.2 Calibration targets
In previous work (Cagetti and De Nardi [14]), we have discussed the relevant empirical counter-
part to concept of entrepreneur in this model. Our entrepreneurs are the self-employed business
owners that actively manage their own rm(s). We identify them in the Survey of Consumer
Finances (SCF) with those that declare that they are self-employed, that they own a business,
and that they actively manage it.
We assume that the worker's income ability process is independent from the entrepreneurial
ability process (Cagetti and De Nardi [13] discuss how the results change with a dierent cor-
relation coecient between the two processes). We consider only two values of entrepreneurial
17Target
Moment Target Model
Capital-output ratio 2.9-3.0 3.0
Percentage of Entrepreneurs 7.5-7.6 7.7
Percentage of Exiting Entrepreneurs 22-24 22.4
Percentage of Workers Entering Entrepreneurship 2.0-3.0 2.4
Median Net Worth of Entrepreneurs to Workers 5.3-6.5 6.2
Percentage of People at Zero Wealth 7-13 11.9
Percentage of Entrepreneurs Hiring on the Labor Market 57.4-64.6 58.8
Revenue from Estate and Gift Taxes (as % of output) 0.2-0.3 0.27
Percentage of Estates Paying Estate Taxes 1.5-2.0 1.9
Table 2: Target values.
Calibrated
Parameter Value
 .91
 f0, 1.16 g
P see text
 .88
 .80
f 75%
b 16%
e 120
Table 3: Calibrated parameters.
18ability: zero (no entrepreneurial ability) and a positive number. This implies that P is a two-
by-two matrix. Since its rows have to sum to one, this gives us two parameters to calibrate.
We also have to choose values for , the degree of decreasing returns to scale to entrepreneurial
ability, , the share of income going to entrepreneurial working capital, f, the fraction of working
capital the entrepreneur can keep in case he defaults, the estate tax rate, and its corresponding
exemption level.
In total, we calibrate nine parameters. We use the rst seven parameters to target the
following moments: the capital-output ratio, the fraction of entrepreneurs in the population, the
fraction of entrepreneurs exiting entrepreneurship during each period, the fraction of workers
becoming entrepreneurs during each period,5 the ratio of median net worth of entrepreneurs
to that of workers, the fraction of people with zero wealth, and the fraction of entrepreneurs
hiring workers on the labor market. We choose the other two parameters to match the revenue
from estate and gift taxes and the fraction of the estates that pay estate taxes. Table 2 reports
the target values from the data and the values generated from our model; Table 3 reports the
parameter values used in our calibration.
For the capital output ratio, we use the Federal Reserve Board Flow of Funds Accounts. We
dene capital as tangible assets excluding consumer durables and excluding federal and state
and local governments assets. The measure thus includes equipment and software, structures,
both residential and nonresidential, and inventories. Equipment and software is measured at
replacement cost; structures are measured at market value (except nonresidential structures
owned by the nancial sector, for which market value information is not recorded). With this
denition, the ratio for the available years (1960-2009) is 2.96. Excluding the data after year
2000, which have experienced rst a large increase and then a boost in house values, the ratio is
slightly smaller, about 2.89.
5Both in the model and in the data, entry and exit rates refer only to people that were in the model (or
survey) in both periods and transitioned from one occupation to the other; they do not include people that die
while running an enterprise, nor people that start their enterprise at the beginning of their economic life. For
this reason, entry, exit, and the steady-state fraction of entrepreneurs are not linked by the identity that would
hold in an economy with innitely-lived agents.
19The fraction of entrepreneurs in the population, the probability of entering and exiting en-
trepreneurship6, the ratio of the median wealth of an entrepreneur to that of a non-entrepreneur
and the fraction of entrepreneurs hiring workers are computed from the 1989 Survey of Con-
sumer Finances (other waves gives similar results). We compute the transition matrix between
entrepreneurship and non-entrepreneurship by looking at households who are present in two
consecutive surveys.
The fraction of the population at zero wealth, also computed from the SCF, is somewhat
sensitive to the exact cuto point (whether exactly zero, or some positive but small amount such
as $100). This fraction varies from roughly 7% to 13%. The percentage of entrepreneurs hiring
workers (besides themselves and, possibly, their spouse) is also computed from the SCF.
We do not use the statutory exemption and tax schedule to model the estate tax. As explained
in Cagetti and De Nardi [14] and in the references therein, these can dier substantially from the
statutory one. We thus calibrate the exemption level and the (at) tax rate above the exemption
to match the percentage of estates that pay an estate tax (2%) and the total amount of revenues
of estate and gift taxes (about .2-.3% of GDP).
5 A Discussion of the Steady State, the Fit of the Model
and its Mechanisms
As we have shown in our previous work, our model of entrepreneurship, although simple, matches
very well the wealth distributions of both entrepreneurs and workers. In presence of borrowing
constraints, this is very important to determine the response to nancial shocks for both the
whole distribution of entrepreneurs and for the important macroeconomic aggregates. Figures 1
and 2 compare the distribution of net worth for workers and entrepreneurs generated by the
6Both in the model and in the data, entry and exit rates refer only to people who were in the model (or
survey) in both periods and transitioned from one occupation to the other; they do not include people who die
while running an enterprise, nor people who start their enterprise at the beginning of their economic life. For this
reason, entry, exit, and the steady-state fraction of entrepreneurs are not linked by the identity that would hold
in an economy with innitely lived agents.
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Figure 1: Distribution of wealth, conditional on wealth being positive, for the whole population.
Dash-dot line: data; solid line: model.
model and in the actual SCF data and conrms that the model generates the long upper tail of
the wealth distribution that is observed in the data for the whole population, and also the large
wealth holdings concentrated in the hands of a few entrepreneurs.
In our calibration the entrepreneurial sector employs about 57% of the capital, a little over the
one reported by the Small Business Administration (which is about 50%).7 It also employs 33%
of the eciency units of labor in the economy; in the data, the Small Business Administration
that they employ almost 50% of the workers in the economy; in the data larger (corporate) rms
tend to pay more, which helps in closing this gap. Table 4 displays the distribution of labor
hiring by entrepreneurial rms. The rst line is computed from the 2007 SCF data, which is
the last survey year before the crisis (the numbers from previous years are very similar). The
question asked in the SCF is how many workers the entrepreneurs hire in their rm (we exclude
the entrepreneur and his or her spouse). To compare it with the model, we assume that the
average employee of the entrepreneurial rm (up to the 95% quantile) lies at either the 33rd
7The gures from the Small Business Administration refer to independent businesses having fewer than 500
employees. This denition is a reasonable, but not perfect match with our entrepreneurs.
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Figure 2: Distribution of wealth, conditional on wealth being positive, for the entrepreneurs.
Dash-dot line: data; solid line: model.
Labor hiring 25% 50% 75% 90% 95%
2007 SCF data, number of workers 0 1 5 18 49
Model, number of 33rd percentile workers 0 0.6 5.0 15 27
Model, number of median workers 0 0.4 2.9 8.8 16
Table 4: Workers hiring in the SCF data and in the model.
quantile (second line) or the median of the eciency distribution (third line) and that it works
full time. Given that part the employees in the SCF data will be part time, we conclude that
the distribution of hiring by entrepreneurial rms in the model matches the one in the data
reasonably well.
To better understand the workings of the model, the left hand side panel of Figure 3 reports
maximum investment as a function of one's net worth (expressed in terms of multiples of average
income) for a young entrepreneur of median worker ability. Until the entrepreneur owns enough
assets, he keeps being a worker and does not enter entrepreneurship. For this reason, both
investment and leverage are reported as being zero until the entry point. The solid line refers to
22the benchmark economy, while the crossed line refers to an economy in which the enforcement
frictions become tighter (f = 0:80, up from 0.75). The picture shows that tighter borrowing
constraints do not shift the amount of resources that one needs to hold to nd it protable to
enter entrepreneurship: the tightening of the constraint discourages entry, but at the same time
it induces a lower interest rate, which has a countervailing eect. Even though entry occurs
at similar wealth levels, tighter borrowing constraints result in smaller investment and leverage
and slow business growth. In the aggregate economy, slower-growing rms result in less capital
accumulation and less inequality. The capital-output ratio in steady state drops from 3.0 to 2.9,
the Gini coeecient drops from 0.81 to 0.79, and the share of net worth held by the richest 1%
drops from 28.4% to 26.4%.
Figure 3: Left panel: Investment as a function of one's net worth (in multiples of average income)
and workers' ability. Right panel: Borrowing as a function of one's assets. baseline model. Right
panel: baseline model and model with tighter borrowing constraints
23In the data, entrepreneurs are much richer than workers, and their saving rate does not
quickly decline with wealth. To match these facts, the calibration implies borrowing limits that
are tight compared to the optimal rm size, hence the growth process of entrepreneurial rms is
slow. This plays an important role for the response of the economy to various shocks, to which
we now turn.
6 Computing Transitions: The shocks and their eects
Throughout the experiments below, a shock hits the economy unexpectedly in year 2 and lasts
for 3 years. After year 4, the exogenous parameters return to their steady state level.
The sequence of events within a period is as follows:
 Idiosyncratic shocks and the unexpected aggregate shock are realized. All agents have
perfect foresight about aggregates from this period onwards.
 Capital markets open; entering entrepreneurs liquidate their positions in corporate stock
and government debt to invest in their own business, and borrow from intermediaries;
workers and retirees (both from the previous period as well as exiting entrepreneurs) ab-
sorb these positions and lend to the intermediaries. Corporate rms raise funds from
intermediaries according to their constraint (3) and deposit any internal funds in excess.8
 Corporate rms and entrepreneurs hire workers and production takes place.
 Wages, taxes, and dividends are paid, loans are repaid, and the government issues new
debt.
 Households consume and government spending occurs.
8We assume that the interest rate on government debt is also reset at this stage, even though debt is issued
at the end of the previous period. Results are very similar if we assume that the rate of return on government
debt is predetermined; in this case, the government would not benet from the drop in i2 and taxes would have
to be slightly higher to balance the budget.
24For each experiment, we isolate the eects of taxes and interest-rate changes by proceeding as
follows. First, we keep lending rates, taxes, and government debt xed at the initial steady state
level, and we let government expenditure adjust to balance the government budget constraint.
Second, we let lending rates clear the capital market in a closed economy, while we still keep
taxes and government debt xed at the initial steady state level, with government spending acting
again as a residual. Finally, we consider an experiment where government spending is xed, and
both taxes and interest rates adjust. In particular, we increase the proportional component of
the tax schedule (s
t ) after the end of the nancial shock, in years 5 through 13, to balance
the present-value budget constraint of the government. We are interested in this comparison
to understand the way in which taxes aect entrepreneurial incentives; a meaningful welfare
comparison between cuts in government spending and increases in tax rates is not possible in
our model, since by assumption government spending is wasted.
6.1 Negative technology shock in the intermediation sector.
We consider the eect of a shock that unexpectedly increases  from 1.5% to 3.5% for three
years.9
This is a way of capturing either of two alternative shocks:
 More monitoring is necessary to ensure loan performance due to the nancial turmoil.
  stands in as payments to a factor that is xed in the short run and that is temporarily
depleted. As an example, suppose that banks face capital requirements and that some
initial losses wipe some of the capital out, constraining the banks' ability to oer additional
intermediation services. In this case, the increase in  would reect the additional reward
for the scarcer banking capital.10
9For a comparison, the spread between Baa corporate bonds and Treasuries jumped to more than 5% after
the recent crisis, and decreased only gradually over the course of 2009.
10To spell out completely this story, we should explain what prevents capital from immediately owing back
into the banking sector.
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Figure 4: Number of entrepreneurs (left) and average size of entrepreneurial rms (right) in
response to a shock to . Steady state = 100. Solid line: xed lending rate, government
spending adjusts. Dashed line: general equilibrium, government spending adjusts. Dotted line:
general equilibrium, taxes adjust.
Figure 4 shows the eect of the nancial intermediation shock on the number of entrepreneurs
and their average rm size. The fraction of entrepreneurs drops, particularly when taxes adjust,
but this margin is not very persistent: when intermediation costs and taxes are back to normal,
entrepreneurs quickly reenter the market. This is because the minimum rm size that makes entry
protable is small, and potential entrepreneurs can save to reach that point quickly. Average rm
size also drops; this eect is bigger and much more persistent. The intermediation cost reduces
the entrepreneurs' cash ow and their ability to retain earnings to foster their business' growth.
Since both the wealth distribution and the distribution of assets across rms that we match is
very spread out, our model implies a very gradual growth of rms, with almost no entrepreneur
attaining sucient wealth that borrowing constraints cease to bind. It follows that any negative
shock has almost a permanent eect on each entrepreneur, and its aggregate impact vanishes
fully only when each entrepreneur loses his ability and closes the rm. As soon as the shock is
over, rm growth resumes, but at a slow pace dictated by the tight borrowing limits.
The alternative ways in which taxes, spending, and interest rates adjust across the three
experiments reveal some dierences. Consider rst the cases in which taxes are held xed, and
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Figure 5: Evolution of interest rates in response to a shock to  when government spending
adjusts: experiment with a xed lending rate (solid = lending rate, dotted = borrowing rate)
and general equilibrium (dashed = lending rate, dash-dotted = borrowing rate).
government spending acts as a residual. Figure 5 plots the borrowing and lending rates for the
case in which the lending rate is held xed (a small open economy) and that in which the capital
market clears. During the periods of the shock, borrowing rates spike higher when savers have
the opportunity of earning a xed rate abroad. As a consequence, in Figure 4, average rm size
drops more when lending rates are held constant (solid line) than when the eect of the shock
is spread between borrowers and savers, as in general equilibrium (dashed line). The dierence
between partial and general equilibrium reverses after the shock is over. The shock triggers a
reduction in aggregate capital; in general equilibrium, the resulting higher interest rates impair
the entrepreneurs' ability to rebuild their balance sheet and lead to a slower recovery in rm size.
The dierences between the solid and dashed lines in Figure 4 are minor compared to the
dierences between either of those lines and the dotted line, which represents the case in which the
government balances its budget by increasing taxes rather than cutting government spending. To
balance the budget, the government needs an increase in the tax rate of about 1.5% for 10 years.
The government imbalance does not have a large impact on the depth of the initial recession, but
it causes a prolonged slump once the scal adjustment takes place. Taxes deprive entrepreneurs
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Figure 6: Value added in the corporate sector (solid) and entrepreneurial sector (dashed), in
response to a shock to . Left panel: general equilibrium with government spending adjusting.
Right panel: general equilibrium with taxes adjusting. Steady state = 100.
of resources to grow their rms, redistributing to government debt holders (workers), and they
also drive a further wedge between savers and borrowers, since they hit capital as well as labor
income. The tax increase is a new hit to the entrepreneurs' cash ow and results in a slow but
persistent erosion of rm size, with a cumulative eect that is more than twice as large compared
to the case of cuts in government spending. The recovery from the double shock of an increase
in the intermediation cost and the subsequent response in taxes is thus delayed and starts from
a weaker position.
Figure 6 compares value added in the entrepreneurial vs. the corporate sector of the economy.
Since both sectors use capital intermediated by the nancial sector, their value added drops when
the cost of accessing the intermediaries' services increases. For our calibration, entrepreneurs are
more reliant on nancial intermediation, and the drop in their value added is twice as large than
it is for the corporate sector. In period 5 the borrowing-cost shock is over and the eect reverses.
In this period, the value added in the entrepreneurial sector grows faster than in the corporate
sector; nonetheless, entrepreneurs do not recover fully, while the corporate sector stages a full
recovery. The dierence across the two sectors is due to the nature of the credit frictions faced by
the two types of rms. Entrepreneurs are primarily constrained by their net worth, which can only
28be rebuilt slowly, whereas corporate rms curtail their investment only because of the additional
cost of borrowing in equation (8), a period-by-period cost that returns almost to normal as
soon as intermediation costs revert to their steady state level. From period 5, the behavior
of the economy in the left and right panels of Figure 6 diverge. When (wasteful) government
spending acts as the residual (left panel), no further shock perturbs the entrepreneurs' wealth
accumulation, and the economy immediately starts on a path of slow convergence back to the
steady state. In contrast, when taxes adjust, their eect on the entrepreneurs' balance sheet
tightens the constraint on entrepreneurial rm size, and results in a reallocation of resources
from entrepreneurs to corporate rms.
Due to computational limitations related to the endogenous borrowing constraints, our model
features an inelastic labor supply, and thus it cannot capture the decline in labor occurring during
the downturn. However, we can analyze the relative allocation of labor across the two sectors,
which we show in Figure 7. This picture mirrors what we observed for output: the recession
caused by the nancial shock shrinks the share of employment at entrepreneurial rms, in line
with Gertler and Gilchist's [21] observation that small rms are more sensitive to the business
cycle. The share of employment at entrepreneurial rms stages a partial recovery when nancial
conditions return to normal, in period 5. From there, it continues on a path of gradual increase
if government spending absorbs the impact of the shock on the government budget, whereas it
drops anew and more markedly if taxes go up instead.
Having analyzed the forces that drive the behavior of our economy, we now turn to their
aggregate implications. Figure 8 plots aggregate GDP. The increase in intermediation costs
(an intermediate input in our economy) depresses TFP and output during the nancial shock.
This is particularly true when lending rates are xed, since in this case capital moves out of the
economy.11 In general equilibrium, the output drop on impact is mostly driven by the TFP eect
of the shock: the drop in output is close to 3%, with 0.3% being due to the misallocation of
factors. As the net worth of entrepreneurs is eroded, the misallocation becomes a more prominent
force; after the shock is over, the entire dierence between the solid line and the steady state is
11National output declines much less, since the capital invested abroad continues to earn a rate of return.
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Figure 7: Employment in the entrepreneurial sector, relative to the corporate sector, in response
to a shock to . Dashed line: general equilibrium, government spending adjusts. Dotted line:
general equilibrium, taxes adjust. Steady state = 100.
due to this misallocation, whereas in general equilibrium (dashed and dotted line) the decrease
in capital accumulation plays a role. When taxes hit the entrepreneurs' ability to accumulate
wealth and grow their own business the economy fares much worse. This second dip would be
less pronounced, the longer the transition period over which taxes are raised; but, of course, in
this case the policy response to the shock would have even more persistent eects.
Figure 9 plots aggregate consumption and investment.12 As in most business-cycle models,
investment bears the brunt of the shock on impact. Nonetheless, consumption drops too. Unlike
a pure tightening of borrowing constraints, a shock to nancial intermediation entails real output
costs, that reduce total available resources from the outset. In general equilibrium, the behavior
of aggregate investment contributes to a slow recovery: after the initial drop in the periods of the
shock, investment never overshoots its steady-state level. When government spending adjusts,
12We do not plot aggregate investment for the case of xed lending rates. In this case, the shock triggers a
large capital outow, and the drop in domestic investment happens on a much bigger scale, reversing itself after
the intermediation shock is over. We do not view these international ows as realistic, but we are interested in
this experiment purely as a way to isolate the eects of interest-rate movements on the economic incentives of
the actors of our economy.
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Figure 8: GDP in response to a shock to . Solid line: xed lending rate, government spending
adjusts. Dashed line: general equilibrium, government spending adjusts. Dotted line: general
equilibrium, taxes adjust. Steady state = 100.
investment merely returns close to steady state; when taxes further depress wealth accumulation,
investment remains 2% below its steady state several years after taxes have returned to their
steady-state level.
It has often been remarked that, during the crisis, credit standards were extremely tight and
that businesses found it dicult to access credit at any price (see for example the Quarterly
Senior Loan Ocer Opinion Survey conducted by the Federal Reserve Board). A similar eect
arises in our model: the increase in intermediation costs is accompanied by an endogenous
tightening of the constraints, because entrepreneurship becomes less protable and thus the
temptation of terminating the business and absconding part of the capital becomes stronger. To
illustrate this mechanism, we run an alternative experiment, where intermediation costs increase
by the same amount and duration (2% for three years), but borrowing constraints are held xed
exogenously at their steady-state values. Figure 10 compares the eect of the intermediation
shock for exogenous and endogenous borrowing constraints, when the government spending acts
as a residual. It shows that the adjustments of the extensive margin are almost exclusively driven
by the tightening of the borrowing limits, that forces potential entrepreneurs to accumulate more
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Figure 9: Aggregate consumption (left panel) and investment (right panel) in response to a
shock to . Solid line: xed lending rate, government spending adjusts. Dashed line: general
equilibrium, government spending adjusts. Dotted line: general equilibrium, taxes adjust. Steady
state = 100.
wealth before entry becomes worthwhile. The prot loss from the intermediation shock leads to
smaller rms even with xed borrowing constraints, but the drop in average rm size is about half
as large. After the shock, the speed of recovery is similar, but the level from which the economy
has to recover is much lower with endogenous borrowing constraints, so that it takes longer to
return to the same level of output. The behavior of GDP with endogenous vs. xed borrowing
limits (Figure 11) mirrors the one for the average size of rms, but quantitatively the tightening
of borrowing constraints has a more muted impact in the periods of the shock. When the shock
is active, both entrepreneurs and corporate rms are subject to it, and holding borrowing limits
xed only benets entrepreneurs. After the shock is over, the gap between the two lines widens,
because the persistent eect of the shock is dictated by the evolution of entrepreneurial wealth,
which is less severely impacted when borrowing constraints are held xed.
Figures 12 and 13 compares the behavior of entrepreneurial rms and GDP with endogenous
vs. xed borrowing constraints in the case in which the government raises taxes to balance its
budget. The dierences are here starker, because an increase in taxes drains the protability of
entrepreneurs and generates its own credit crunch if borrowing constraints are allowed to adjust
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Figure 10: Number of entrepreneurs (left) and average size of entrepreneurial rms (right) in
response to a shock to  with borrowing constraints held xed (solid line) and allowed to vary
endogenously (dashed line). Steady state = 100. General equilibrium, government spending
adjusts.
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Figure 11: GDP in response to a shock to  with borrowing constraints held xed (solid line)
and allowed to vary endogenously (dashed line). Steady state = 100. General equilibrium,
government spending adjusts.
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Figure 12: Number of entrepreneurs (left) and average size of entrepreneurial rms (right) in
response to a shock to  with borrowing constraints held xed (solid line) and allowed to vary
endogenously (dashed line). Steady state = 100. General equilibrium, taxes adjust.
endogenously.
6.2 Negative technology shock in the intermediation sector, only for
entrepreneurs.
In the wake of the nancial crisis of 2008, the government took several actions aimed at restoring
calm in several nancial markets. Among the actions that were most successful ex-post was a
blanket guarantee of money-market mutual funds, and thus, indirectly, of the commercial paper
of corporate industrial rms that those funds purchased. More in general, companies with direct
access to markets seemed better able to cope than those that were forced to go through the
banking sector.13
In this section, we consider the same shock to  as in the previous section, but we assume
that the government neutralizes its impact on the corporate sector; we do so by varying t to
hold tt constant throughout. We take the best-case scenario in which this policy comes at no
13For instance, data from the Flow of Funds accounts show that bond issuance for large corporations recovered
quickly after the nancial crisis, while bank lending remained subdued for several years.
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Figure 13: GDP in response to a shock to  with borrowing constraints held xed (solid line)
and allowed to vary endogenously (dashed line). Steady state = 100. General equilibrium, taxes
adjust.
cost, in the way this happened with the money market guarantee ex-post.14
Figure 14 studies the dierences between this experiment and the case of a pure shock to  for
the entrepreneurial sector, in the case of general equilibrium and xed taxes (with government
spending adjusting as a residual). Since corporate rms are insulated from the shock in this new
experiment, entrepreneurs face stier competition in the factor markets, which thins their ranks
and leads them to shrink their rm size more. The recovery is aected by two opposite forces.
The greater hit taken by entrepreneurs slows the return to the steady state. However, aggregate
investment (Figure 15) drops less when only one sector is hit by the shock, and the additional
capital is benecial to the recovery. The rst force dominates in the short run, but about 5 years
after the shock the two experiments become quite similar.
Figure 16 displays the value added in the two sectors in response to the shock to  and
the contemporaneous oset through . When the corporate sector is completely insulated, its
size actually expands during the nancial disruption, as it poaches workers and capital from the
14We could easily add a cost to this guarantee, in which case taxes would have to go up more during the
transition, and would exacerbate the persistence of the drop in output.
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Figure 14: Number of entrepreneurs (left) and average size of entrepreneurial rms (right) in
response to a shock to  (solid line), and to  and  simultaneously (dashed line). Steady state
= 100. General equilibrium, government spending adjusts.
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Figure 15: Aggregate investment in response to a shock to  (solid line), and to  and  si-
multaneously (dashed line). Steady state = 100. General equilibrium, government spending
adjusts.
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Figure 16: Value added in the corporate sector (solid) and entrepreneurial sector (dashed), in
response to a shock to  and  simultaneously. General equilibrium with government spending
adjusting.
entrepreneurs.
Figure 17 shows how all of these eects combine to determine aggregate GDP. Even in
the best-case scenario in which the government intervention entails no cost, it is successful at
reducing the severity of the recession, but it has almost no impact on the recovery. By helping
the corporate sector, the government exacerbates the misallocation of resources due to nancial
frictions.
6.3 A shock to required collateral.
Here, we consider a shock that increases the collateral that the entrepreneurs need to secure their
loans. Specically, we raise the fraction of capital than can be absconded (f) from 75% to 80%.
We calibrate this shock to have an eect on aggregate output during the credit crunch that is of
similar magnitude of the drop that we obtained considering a shock to , for the cases of general
equilibrium. This can be seen in Figure 18.15
15For brevity, we present only the case in which government spending adjusts to restore budget balance. The
conclusions that we draw for this case apply also to the case in which taxes adjust instead.
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Figure 17: GDP in response to a shock to  (solid line), and to  and  simultaneously (dashed
line). Steady state = 100. General equilibrium, government spending adjusts.
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Figure 18: GDP in response to a shock to f (solid line) and  (dashed line). Steady state = 100.
General equilibrium, government spending adjusts.
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Figure 19: Number of entrepreneurs (left) and average size of entrepreneurial rms (right) in
response to a shock to f (solid line) and  (dashed line). Steady state = 100. General equilibrium,
government spending adjusts.
Since this shock only aects the entrepreneurial sector, matching the output drop in impact
requires a much deeper contraction in the number of entrepreneurs and rm size when f increases
than the baseline case in which borrowing costs increase for both entrepreneurs and corporate
rms. This can be seen in Figure 19. It might seem surprising that the deeper contraction
in entrepreneurial rms does not bear bigger implications for the entrepreneurs wealth in the
recovery phase. The reason for this result is that a shock to f hits only the marginal prots of
the rm: it forces entrepreneurs to shrink their scale, but it has no eect on their prots for a
given scale of operations. In contrast, an increase in  raises the rental rate of capital paid by
entrepreneurs; this eect applies to all of the capital that they rent, and has a negative eect on
their prots even conditioning on their scale of operations.
6.4 A TFP shock.
We nally contrast a credit shock to a TFP shock that hits both the corporate sector and the
entrepreneurial sector. In this case, total factor productivity drops by 2.5% for 3 years, and
subsequently reverts to steady state. Once again, the magnitude of the TFP drop is chosen so
as to obtain a similar GDP drop on impact in general equilibrium. As Figures 20 and 21 show,
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Figure 20: GDP in response to a shock to TFP (solid line) and  (dashed line). Steady state =
100. General equilibrium, government spending adjusts.
the evolution of the economy under this shock is fairly similar to that of a shock to .
7 Conclusion
From the experiments that we ran, we learn three lessons. First, and foremost, we nd that it
is not the source of the disturbance that determines our economy's speed of recovery, but rather
the way in which the shock aects the protability of credit-constrained entrepreneurs. Recovery
is comparatively slowest in the case of an increase in borrowing rates from which the corporate
sector is shielded (our experiment of Section 6.2). Among our experiments, this one has the
shallowest recession, and yet during the recovery output is at a similar level as that of the others,
in which the economy needs to make up for deeper drops. When losses are concentrated in the
entrepreneurial sector, it takes more time for entrepreneurs to rebuild their balance sheet.
Second, the way public nances adjust in response to the shortfalls caused by a recession is
important. Income taxes are a further drain on the cash ow available for successful business
owners to grow and represent a further signicant drag on the economy. From an eciency per-
spective, entrepreneurship subsidies would contribute to increase output. It should be noted that
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Figure 21: Number of entrepreneurs (left) and average size of entrepreneurial rms (right) in
response to a shock to TFP (solid line) and  (dashed line). Steady state = 100. General
equilibrium, government spending adjusts.
this does not necessarily imply that subsidizing entrepreneurs is an optimal policy. Even if it were
easy to identify the exact counterpart to credit-constrained, highly productive entrepreneurs, this
policy would require taxing workers, who are on average far poorer in our economy, as in the
data, to subsidize comparatively richer business owners, raising equity considerations.
Finally, in an environment with endogenous borrowing constraints, nancial shocks that
increase interest costs have two eects. The interest rate increase represents a direct drain on
rms' prots. The indirect eect is that higher borrowing rates trigger a tightening of credit
limits. Hence, for a given contraction in credit, nancial shocks that aect borrowing rates have
potentially more severe implications than pure credit rationing.
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